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Sentencing Discretion at Gunpoint:
How to Think about Convictions Underlying
§ 924(c) Mandatory Minimums
Molly Bootht
[M]andatory minimum sentences are perhaps a good example of
the law of unintended consequences.
-William H. Rehnquist'
INTRODUCTION
United States v Booker2 rapidly broadened judicial discretion in
federal sentencing by rendering the United States Sentencing Guide-
lines merely advisory. But the Guidelines do not apply to sentences
for all crimes. Some criminal statutes, such as 18 USC § 924(c), estab-
lish separate mandatory minimum sentences. Because Booker only
applies to the Guidelines, it does not apply to crimes with statutory
mandatory minimum sentences. Section § 924(c) makes it a crime to
use a firearm in the course of committing a crime of violence or a drug
trafficking offense, and the statute punishes the use of the firearm
with a mandatory minimum sentence. Prosecutors separately charge
the underlying crime of violence or drug trafficking offense (underly-
ing offense), and underlying offenses are usually punished by the
Guidelines. Section 924(c) indicates that the mandatory minimum
must run subsequent to other convictions. Therefore, a defendant con-
victed of a § 924(c) firearms offense and a crime of violence must
serve his entire Guidelines sentence for the crime of violence before
beginning his mandatory minimum sentence for the § 924(c) convic-
tion. When sentencing such a defendant, the court uses broad Booker
discretion to determine the appropriate sentence for the underlying
t BA 2008, The University of Chicago; JD Candidate 2011, The University of Chicago
Law School.
1 William H. Rehnquist, Luncheon Address, in United States Sentencing Commission,
Drugs and Violence in America: Proceedings of the Inaugural Symposium on Crime and Punish-
ment in the United States 283,286 (1993).
2 543 US 220 (2005).
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crime of violence, but the court cannot lower the mandatory minimum
under § 924(c). When considering the appropriate sentence for the
underlying crime, a judge may want to use his Booker discretion to
consider the total amount of time the defendant will spend in prison,
including the amount of time the defendant will have to serve under
§ 924(c) after completing the Guidelines sentence. This Comment fo-
cuses on the extent to which judges may consider the presence of a
firearms mandatory minimum3 when sentencing a defendant on the
separate, underlying charge.
Most circuits that have addressed the issue have held that a judge
may not consider the time a defendant will subsequently serve under
§ 924(c) when determining the appropriate punishment for the under-
lying offense. These courts reason that when a judge decides to lower
the Guidelines sentence because of the consecutive mandatory mini-
mum that the defendant will serve after the Guidelines sentence ends,
the judge undermines Congress's purpose in setting that consecutive
mandatory minimum.
Section 924(c), however, does not abrogate a judge's sentencing
discretion for the underlying offense. Two portions of the statute dis-
cuss the treatment of underlying conduct. First, § 924(c) provides that
its punishments shall be given "in addition to the punishment pro-
vided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime."' Second,
the statute also provides that "no term of imprisonment imposed on a
person under this subsection shall run concurrently with any other
term of imprisonment imposed on the person, including any term of
imprisonment imposed for the crime of violence or drug trafficking
crime during which the firearm was used, carried, or possessed."'
This Comment shows that neither of these provisions limits a
judge's discretion to consider the totality of the defendant's punish-
ment when sentencing for the underlying offense, so long as the sen-
tence for the firearms conviction is not below the mandatory mini-
mum and the firearms sentence runs consecutively with the sentence
for the underlying conviction. Because § 924(c) does not affect judicial
3 Even though there are multiple statutes carrying mandatory minimums, most opinions
dealing with this Comment's issue involve mandatory minimums under § 924(c). Many statutes
bearing mandatory minimums do not have underlying convictions. See, for example, 21 USC
§ 841 (relating to the manufacture and distribution of controlled substances); 21 USC § 844
(relating to the possession of controlled substances); 21 USC § 960 (imposing penalties for the
import or export of controlled substances). But see 18 USC § 1028A (involving a consecutive
mandatory minimum for identity theft). Because § 1028A does involve an underlying conviction,
this Comment draws on its language, history, and related jurisprudence for the purposes of inter-
preting § 924(c).
4 18 USC § 924(c)(1)(A).
5 18 USC § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii).
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sentencing discretion for underlying crimes, ordinary Booker discre-
tion applies. Therefore, the boundaries for sentencing the underlying
conduct are recent Supreme Court precedent, 18 USC § 3553(a), and
18 USC § 3661. All of these sources suggest that a judge should con-
sider the totality of the defendant's sentence. This Comment in no way
disputes that judges generally lack the power to sentence below man-
datory minimum sentences. Rather, this Comment examines the sepa-
rate sentences for the underlying conviction, for which judges already
have broad discretion to deviate from the Guidelines.
Part I of this Comment reviews the background and mechanics of
§ 924(c) as well as recent changes to Guidelines jurisprudence. It in-
troduces 18 USC § 1028A, a statute that also creates consecutive
mandatory minimums, for the purpose of comparing the two texts and
legislative histories. Part II discusses recent district and circuit court
opinions that address the emerging tension among the courts concern-
ing whether judges may consider the § 924(c) mandatory minimum
when sentencing for the underlying offense. Part III uses § 1028A to
come to the correct interpretation of § 924(c) and argues that courts
should be allowed to consider the presence of a consecutive mandato-
ry minimum to the extent that the minimum bears on the relevant
statutory sentencing factors.
I. BACKGROUND
When a defendant is sentenced under § 924(c), he receives both
the mandatory minimum sentence for the firearm offense and a sepa-
rate sentence for the underlying conduct. The sentence for the under-
lying conduct is calculated with reference to the (now advisory)
Guidelines and pursuant to 18 USC § 3553, 18 USC § 3661, and Booker
6 See Spears v United States, 129 S Ct 840,843 (2009) (affirming the district court's substi-
tution of a 20-to-1 crack-powder ratio for the Guidelines' 100-to-1 ratio); Kimbrough v United
States, 552 US 85, 91, 101-02 (2007) (allowing for departures because of policy-based disagree-
ments with the guidelines); Rita v United States, 551 US 338,351 (2007) (noting the wide range of
acceptable considerations for sentencing courts and upholding an appellate presumption of
reasonableness when sentences fall within the Guidelines' recommendation); Gall v United
States, 552 US 38, 50 (2007) (holding that district courts, in deciding whether to sentence within
the Guidelines' recommended range, must make an "individualized assessment based on the
facts presented").
7 Although not this Comment's focus, it is worth noting that the Supreme Court has
granted certiorari on a separate issue involving the interpretation of § 924(c). See United States v
Abbott, 574 F3d 203 (3d Cir 2009), cert granted, 130 S Ct 1284 (2010). The Court will decide
whether the opening clause of § 924(c)-which states that "[e]xcept to the extent that a greater
minimum sentence is otherwise provided by this subsection or by any other provision of law" -
precludes the mandatory firearms minimum when the defendant is subject to another mandatory
minimum under this or another statute bearing a mandatory minimum.
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and its progeny. The defendant's total sentence is therefore a product
of both congressionally mandated minimums, in which judges have no
discretion, and Guidelines-based sentences, for which judges have
broad sentencing discretion. Part L.A provides an overview of § 924(c),
discussing the language of the statute, its mechanics, its history, and its
relationship with the Guidelines. Part I.B describes recent Supreme
Court precedent on judicial sentencing discretion.
A. Interpreting § 924(c)
1. Language and mechanics.
Section 924(c) creates mandatory minimum sentences for possess-
ing, brandishing, or discharging a firearm in the course of committing a
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime.' It explicitly discusses sen-
tencing for underlying conduct in two places. First, the statute describes
the mandatory minimum as being "in addition to the punishment pro-
vided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime.,,.. Second, the
statute provides that "no term of imprisonment imposed on a person
under this subsection shall run concurrently with any other term of im-
prisonment imposed on the person, including any term of imprisonment
imposed for the crime of violence or drug trafficking crime during
which the firearm was used, carried, or possessed.""
For an example of how § 924(c) operates, suppose Joe Robber
robs a bank with a firearm. Further suppose that the prosecutor
charges Mr. Robber, and he is convicted under § 924(c) for the use of
the firearm and under 18 USC § 2113 for the robbery itself. Note that
the § 2113 charge is for an unarmed bank robbery, because Mr. Rob-
ber is already being charged for the use of the firearm. If Mr. Robber
had simply carried a firearm, he would receive an automatic five
years; if he brandished it, he would receive seven." Mr. Robber would
receive a mandatory minimum of ten years if he discharged the fire-
arm." All of these firearms sentences would begin after the end of his
sentence for the bank robbery. The length of the mandatory minimum
depends on how many times Mr. Robber has been convicted under
8 For a discussion of the development of Supreme Court jurisprudence on federal sen-
tencing under the Guidelines, see Part I.B.1.
9 18 USC § 924(c)(1)(A).
10 18 USC § 924(c)(1)(A).
11 18 USC § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii).
12 18 USC § 924(c)(1)(A)(i).
13 18 USC § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii).
14 18 USC § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii).
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§ 924(c). If Mr. Robber had previously been convicted under § 924(c),
he would serve twenty-five years for the new § 924(c) conviction."
Now suppose that Joe Robber had been a little more ambitious
and had robbed three banks while possessing a firearm before he was
caught. Mr. Robber could be charged and convicted for three bank
robberies and three firearms counts under § 924(c). Assuming Mr.
Robber had never been previously convicted under § 924(c), Mr.
Robber would serve his time for the bank robberies, and then he
would serve five years for the first § 924(c) conviction and twenty-five
years for each of the subsequent two firearm convictions. Thus, after
Mr. Robber finishes his robbery sentences, he will serve another fifty-
five years in prison for having a firearm while committing those rob-
beries. Note that a prosecutor may choose not to charge Mr. Robber
under § 924(c) and instead just charge him under the bank robbery
statute. In that case, his Guidelines "offense level" would increase for
the possession of the firearm." Such an enhancement may add an ad-
ditional 29 to 46 months to the low end of the Guidelines range, de-
pending on Mr. Robber's criminal history category." Given these low-
er enhancements, Mr. Robber would much prefer that the prosecutor
charge him with the armed bank robbery rather than charge him for
unarmed bank robbery and separately for the firearm.
2. History of § 924(c) and evidence of congressional intent.
Because § 924(c) was enacted as a floor amendment to the Gun
Control Act of 1968," there is little legislative history to aid in the in-
terpretation of the original Act.20 Before discussing congressional in-
tent regarding the consecutive nature of the sentence, it is first useful
to get a handle on the overall purpose of the statute. Congress passed
the Act shortly after the assassinations of Martin Luther King, Jr and
15 18 USC § 924(c)(1)(C).
16 See Deal v United States, 508 US 129, 133 (1993) (noting that any other reading of the
statute "would give a prosecutor unreviewable discretion either to impose or to waive the en-
hanced sentencing provisions of § 924(c)(1) by opting to charge and try the defendant either in
separate prosecutions or under a multicount indictment").
17 See USSG § 2B3.1(b)(2).
18 See, for example, USSG § 2B3.1(b)(2) (indicating that for robbery, discharging a firearm
carries a seven-level enhancement, using a firearm carries a six-level enhancement, and bran-
dishing or possessing a firearm carries a five-level enhancement).
19 Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub L No 90-618,82 Stat 1213, codified as amended at 18 USC
§ 921 et seq.
20 For further discussion of the legislative history that is available, see Simpson v United
States, 435 US 6, 13-14 (1978) (using a floor statement to evince congressional intent in the ab-
sence of any legislative hearings or committee reports). See also United States v Angelos, 345 F
Supp 2d 1227, 1233-35 (D Utah 2004) (noting that "the court is left only with a few statements
made during floor debate"), affd, 433 F3d 738 (10th Cir 2006).
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Robert F. Kennedy. The conference report noted that the purpose of
the Act was to "provide for better control of the interstate traffic in
firearms."" Discussion on the House floor indicated that the purpose
of the statute was to encourage criminals to leave their guns at home
if they intended to go out and commit felonies.22
The Act as proposed, and as passed, had no consecutiveness pro-
vision," although such an amendment was proposed on the House
floor.24 The provision mandating that sentences be served consecutive-
ly was adopted by the House but was removed from the bill in confer-
ence." Richard Poff, a Republican representing Virginia, offered the
amendment as an alternative to one that contained harsher minimum
sentences.26 There was little discussion of how the Act would relate to
existing sentencing structures. 2  The Act was finally amended to
mandate consecutive sentencing as part of the Omnibus Crime Con-
trol Act of 1970.8 Although the House version of the Omnibus Crime
Control Act did not contain an amendment mandating that the
§ 924(c) sentence run consecutively, the Senate version was adopted in
conference. This amendment mandated consecutive sentencing only
for repeat § 924(c) convictions and also eliminated the possibility for
judges to suspend the sentence or to allow it to be served on parole.
Consecutiveness for the first conviction under § 924(c) was not man-
dated until 1984."
21 HR Conf Rep No 90-1956, 90th Cong, 2d Sess (1968), in 114 Cong Rec H 30568 (Oct 10,
1968), reprinted in 1968 USCCAN 4426,4426.
22 114 Cong Rec H 22231 (July 19,1968) (Rep Poff).
23 Gun Control Act of 1968,82 Stat at 1224.
24 114 Cong Rec at H 22231-48 (cited in note 22) (Rep Poff) ("My substitute is ... stronger
in that it compels the court to impose the sentence to run consecutively upon the penalty pre-
viously imposed for the basic crime.").
25 HR Conf Rep No 90-1956, 114 Cong Rec at H 30571 (cited in note 21) ("The conference
substitute is identical to the House bill, except that ... concurrent sentencing under the section is
not prohibited."). The requirement of consecutive sentences was added again in 1971. See Omni-
bus Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub L No 91-644,84 Stat 1880, 1889-90 (1971).
26 114 Cong Rec at H 22231 (cited in note 22).
27 Representative Poff described the amendment as "invoking separate and supplemental
penalties," and it originally mandated that the sentence run consecutive to any term of impris-
onment imposed for the underlying felony. 114 Cong Rec at H 22231 (cited in note 22) (Rep
Poff). Bill Harsha, a Republican representing Ohio who supported the amendment, noted that
judges had been "too lenient in their exercise of judicial discretion." 114 Cong Rec at H 22234
(cited in note 22) (Rep Harsha).
28 Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub L No 91-644,84 Stat 1880, 1889-90 (1971).
29 HR Conf Rep 91-1768,91st Cong, 2d Sess (1970), reprinted in 1970 USCCAN 5842, 5848.
30 See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 § 1005(a), Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat
1837,2138-39 ("[N]or shall the term of imprisonment imposed under this subsection run concur-
rently with any other term of imprisonment including that imposed for the crime of violence in
wjiich the firearm was used or carried.").
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There is good reason to believe that Congress meant § 924(c) to
deter the use of firearms more generally and did not mean to target
the limited felonies for which the federal courts had jurisdiction. That
Congress was not targeting the underlying felonies makes it more
likely that Congress did not mean to affect judicial discretion in de-
termining an appropriate punishment for those underlying felonies. At
various points throughout its history, § 924(c) was presented as a way
of combating gun violence without affecting lawful gun owners. After
Representative Poff first introduced the amendment, Representative
Roman Pucinski, a Democrat from Illinois, described the proposal as
ignoring the "bulk of the problem"-namely the use of firearms in all
crimes, the majority of which are state crimes." Importantly, Repre-
sentative Poff agreed that the "bulk of the problem rests in that area"
but argued that "if the Federal Government is to deal with that ... the
only way we can proceed under the Constitution is to amend the Con-
stitution."" Representative Poff further stated that the bill was meant
to combat gun violence but could do so only insofar as gun violence
could create federal jurisdiction.33 When the bill was later amended,
the Senate Judiciary Committee report quoted Senator Mike Mans-
field in describing the bill's intended target: "Gun crime is a national
disgrace. ... [N]o burden is imposed on the law-abiding gun owner....
The burden falls squarely where it belongs-on the criminal and the
lawless; on those who roam the streets, gun in hand, ready and willing
to perpetrate their acts of violence."" Insofar as the legislative history
speaks to the relationship between the use of the gun and the underly-
ing felony, it indicates that the felonies affected were not targeted as
needing further deterrence. Congress wanted to deal with the use of
weapons however it could, and bootstrapping the weapons violation
to preexisting federal felonies was the only way Congress could ac-
complish its goal.
Another broad theme in § 924(c)'s legislative history is the con-
tinuous elongation of its mandated minimums and the expansion of its
coverage. As originally enacted, the statute mandated a one-year min-
imum for the first use of a firearm to commit a felony and a five-year
minimum for subsequent offenses." In 1971, Congress amended the
statute so that subsequent offenses would be punishable by a two-year
31 114 Cong Rec at H 22232 (cited in note 22) (Rep Pucinski) ("[T]his amendment would
really omit the people that are creating the biggest problem in this country.").
32 Id (Rep Poff).
33 Id.
34 S Rep No 91-539, 91st Cong, 1st Sess 2 (1969), reprinted in 115 Cong Rec S 34838
(Nov 19,1969) (Sen Mansfield).
35 Gun Control Act of 1968,82 Stat at 1224, codified as amended at 18 USC § 924(c).
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mandatory minimum and so that these sentences also would not run
concurrently with any sentence imposed for the underlying conduct.
In 1984, Congress again increased the mandatory minimum to five
years for the first instance of offending conduct. The Firearms Own-
ers' Protection Act of 19 8 63 further increased mandatory minimums
for certain kinds of especially dangerous firearms and amended the
statute so that it also applied to drug trafficking offenses. Congress
continued to increase mandatory minimums for subsequent offenses
until 1998, when it increased the minimum to its current length of
twenty-five years.i Some judges have cited the many increases in the
mandatory minimums as suggestive of their unreasonableness.41
3. 18 USC § 1028A as a basis for interpretation.
Section 1028A, passed in 2000, provides separate punishment for
identity theft during or in relation to certain other felonies.42 The stat-
ute is similar to § 924(c) in that both statutes establish a consecutive
mandatory minimum and both are triggered by an underlying felony.
The relevant provisions are in subsection (b):
(b) Consecutive sentence. Notwithstanding any other provision
of law-
(2) except as [otherwise provided], no term of imprisonment im-
posed on a person under this section shall run concurrently with
36 Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970,84 Stat at 1889-90, codified as amended at 18 USC
§ 924(c). Although this Act lowered the mandatory minimum for subsequent offenses, the
amendment to 18 USC § 924(c) was entitled "Stricter Sentences," anticipating that by making the
mandatory minimums consecutive, the overall sentences would be longer.
37 Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 § 1005, 98 Stat at 2138-39, codified as
amended at 18 USC § 924(c).
38 Firearms Owners' Protection Act of 1986, Pub L No 99-308, 100 Stat 449, codified as
amended at 18 USC § 921 et seq.
39 Firearms Owners' Protection Act of 1986 § 104, 100 Stat at 457, codified as amended at
18 USC § 924(c) (increasing the mandatory minimum "if the firearm is a machinegun, or is
equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler").
40 Act of Nov 13, 1998, Pub L No 105-386, 112 Stat 3469, 3469, codified as amended at 18
USC § 924(c).
41 See, for example, Angelos, 345 F Supp 2d at 1233. It is important to note that it is not
necessary to believe that the § 924(c) mandatory minimums are irrational or too harsh in order
to argue that the presence of the minimum should not affect judicial discretion in sentencing for
the underlying felonies. But courts that do account for the mandatory minimum in sentencing for
the underlying conduct often express reservations about the wisdom of § 924(c) mandatory
sentences. See, for example, United States v Ezell, 417 F Supp 2d 667, 674 (ED Pa 2006) (noting
that, after "nearly forty years of judicial interpretation and Congressional amendments," the
court was bound to a mandatory minimum of 132 years), affd, 265 Fed Appx 70 (3d Cir 2008).
42 18 USC § 1028A(a).
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any other term of imprisonment imposed on the person under
any other provision of law, including any term of imprisonment
imposed for the felony during which the means of identification
was transferred, possessed, or used;
(3) in determining any term of imprisonment to be imposed for
the felony during which the means of identification was trans-
ferred, possessed, or used, a court shall not in any way reduce the
term to be imposed for such crime so as to compensate for, or
otherwise take into account, any separate term of imprisonment
imposed or to be imposed for a violation of this section."
Although both § 1028A and § 924(c) set consecutive mandatory min-
imums where there are underlying convictions, the statutes differ in
their instructions to courts on whether to consider the presence of a
mandatory minimum when sentencing for underlying charges. Sec-
tion 1028A(b)(2) is almost identical to the § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii) provi-
sion, which reads as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law ... no term of impris-
onment imposed on a person under this subsection shall run con-
currently with any other term of imprisonment imposed on the
person, including any term of imprisonment imposed for the
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime during which the fire-
arm was used, carried, or possessed."
The statutes' similarity is unsurprising, because there is evidence
that § 1028A was modeled in part on § 924(c).4' Importantly, al-
though both contain a "consecutive" clause, § 1028A(b)(3) has a
separate and unique provision that specifically addresses judicial
sentencing discretion.
Several courts have noted the statutory similarity as grounds for
43 18 USC § 1028A(b).
44 18 USC § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii).
45 See Theft Investigation and Penalties: Hearing on HR 1731 before the House Subcommit-
tee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, 108th Cong, 1st Sess (2003) (testimony of Timothy
Coleman, Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General), online at http//judiciary.house.gov/legacy/
colemanO32304.htm (visited Aug 30,2010) ("Because 'aggravated identity theft' is unusual in that it
is a derivative offense, like the conduct prohibited by § 924(c), a similar approach makes eminent
sense here.").
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meaningful contrast," and in United States v Vidal-Reyes,4 the First
Circuit compared the statutes to determine the appropriate level of
judicial discretion in considering the presence of a § 1028A mandatory
minimum when sentencing for other conduct.' The First Circuit indi-
cated that a court may consider the presence of a § 1028A mandatory
minimum when sentencing non-underlying conduct. Pedro Vidal-
Reyes was convicted of aggravated identity theft under § 1028A, but
his other convictions did not underlie the § 1028A mandatory mini-
mum because of the "temporal disparities between their commission
and the commission of the aggravated identity theft charges."" The
First Circuit established a presumption that the district court has the
discretion to consider the entirety of a defendant's sentence unless the
statute, when read in light of congressional intent, says otherwise.% The
court ultimately found that the § 1028A mandatory minimum was not
meant to curb judicial discretion when sentencing for non-underlying
offenses." The court further implied that a sentencing court may be
able to consider the presence of a consecutive mandatory minimum in
sentencing for the underlying conduct where the mandatory minimum
statute does not specifically preclude such consideration, although the
court did not reach this issue. The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have
referenced Vidal-Reyes when discussing whether a district court may
consider the presence of a consecutive mandatory minimum under
§ 924(c) when sentencing for the underlying felony." Neither opinion
held that a district court has such discretion.
46 See, for example, United States v Rose, 587 F3d 695, 705-06 (5th Cir 2009) (contrasting
the mens rea requirements in the two statutes); United States v Flucker, 343 Fed Appx 474, 475
n 1 (11th Cir 2009) (noting that a court may sentence below § 924(c) or § 1028A mandatory
minimums only upon the government's motion); United States v Jenkins-Watts, 574 F3d 950, 970
(8th Cir 2009) (using a similar case concerning § 924(c) to show that a defendant may be con-
victed under § 1028A without being charged with the underlying offense); United States v Reiss,
278 Fed Appx 991, 992 (11th Cir 2008) (noting the similarities between the two statutes in con-
cluding that under both statutes a defendant may be convicted without being charged with the
underlying felony); United States v Godin, 476 F Supp 2d 1, 2-3 & n 2 (D Me 2007) (describing
§ 924(c) as an "apt analogy" to § 1028A with respect to mens rea requirements).
47 562 F3d 43 (1st Cir 2009).
48 See id at 52 n 7 ("There is evidence that 924(c) influenced the drafting of § 1028A.").
49 Id at 50 n 6 (noting that the non-underlying nature of the other counts was not in dispute).
50 Id at 49.
51 Vidal-Reyes, 562 F3d at 51.
52 See id at 49,52.
53 See United States v Ressam, 593 F3d 1095, 1124 n 8 (9th Cir 2010); United States v
Calabrese, 572 F3d 362, 369 (7th Cir 2009). Neither opinion discusses Vidal-Reyes or § 1028A
at any length.
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B. The Expansion of Judicial Discretion under the United States
Sentencing Guidelines
Ordinarily, the offense underlying § 924(c) has no mandatory
minimum itself, and judges are allowed considerable discretion in de-
termining the appropriate sentence. This Part discusses the legal
bounds of this ordinary Booker sentencing discretion. After these
boundaries are established, it becomes clearer that the consideration
of a subsequent § 924(c) mandatory minimum falls within the scope of
Booker sentencing discretion.
1. Statutory and Guidelines treatment of underlying felonies.
When determining a defendant's sentence, courts must consider
the factors enumerated in 18 USC § 3553(a). Where the § 3553(a) fac-
tors directly conflict with the advisory Guidelines, the factors control.
These factors are: (1) the "nature and circumstances of the offense and
the history and characteristics of the defendant"; (2) the "need for the
sentence imposed" to reflect the enumerated purposes of punishment;
(3) the "kinds of sentences available"; (4) the sentence suggested by the
Guidelines; (5) pertinent Sentencing Commission policy statements;
(6) "the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defend-
ants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar con-
duct"; and (7) the need for restitution.5s The statute requires that a sen-
tencing court "impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than neces-
sary, to comply with" the previously enumerated purposes of punish-
ment: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation." Sen-
tencing discretion is also subject to 18 USC § 3661, which provides, in
full: "No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the
background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense
which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the
purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence."
Unlike § 3553(a) and § 3661, the Guidelines directly address the is-
sue of judicial discretion in sentencing for underlying conduct that has
triggered a mandatory minimum. USSG § 5G1.2(a) provides, "[T]he
sentence to be imposed on a count for which the statute (1) specifies a
term of imprisonment to be imposed; and (2) requires that such term of
imprisonment be imposed to run consecutively to any other term of
54 See Kimbrough v United States, 552 US 85,113 (2007) (Scalia concurring).
55 18 USC § 3553(a).
56 18 USC § 3553(a) (stating that a sentence should "provide just punishment," "afford
adequate deterrence," "protect the public from further crimes," and "provide the defendant with
needed ... training").
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imprisonment, shall be determined by that statute and imposed inde-
pendently." Of course, after Booker, the Guidelines are advisory.7
Some tension exists between § 5G1.2(a) and § 3553(a)(6), which
instructs judges to avoid the creation of unwarranted disparities
among similarly situated defendants. For instance, imagine that two
defendants commit identical armed bank robberies. One is charged
with the bank robbery and receives a Guidelines enhancement for
brandishing a firearm, while the other is charged separately for the
bank robbery and the use of the weapon under § 924(c). Assuming
identical criminal histories, the first defendant's total Guidelines sen-
tence range will often be substantially lower than the second defend-
ant's mandatory minimum for the use of the weapon alone. 5 Such a
disparity is arguably "unwarranted" under § 3553(a)(6), yet this dis-
parity is required by § 5G1.2(a)'s mandate to sentence the § 924(c)
offense and the underlying offense independently. The new emphasis
on the § 3553 sentencing factors in light of Booker and Kimbrough v
United States'9 creates a tension that did not need to be reconciled
when the Guidelines were binding.
2. Sentencing discretion under the Guidelines before and
after Booker.
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984- created the United States
Sentencing Commission for the purpose of "establish[ing] sentencing
policies and practices" by developing guideline sentences for federal
criminal conduct. Part of the Act's purpose was to alleviate perceived
disparities in federal criminal sentences due to the great degree of
judicial discretion.62 There was a widespread concern that a federal
defendant's sentence was largely a function of which judge was con-
ducting the sentencing rather than a function of the defendant's con-
duct.6 By reducing judicial discretion, however, it became possible for
a prosecutor to affect a defendant's sentence by manipulating the
charge, thus worsening sentencing disparities among similarly situated
defendants. Because of this possibility, the Guidelines introduced
57 When analyzing the importance of USSG § 5G1.2(a), not all circuits acknowledge the
Guidelines' generally advisory nature. See, for example, United States v Franklin, 499 F3d 578,
584 (6th Cir 2007) (referring to § 5G1.2(a) as a "mandate").
58 See text accompanying notes 10-18.
59 552 US 85 (2007).
6o Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub L No 98-473, ch 2, 98 Stat 1987, codified as
amended at 18 USC § 3551 et seq and 28 USC § 991 et seq.
61 28 USC § 991(b)(1).
62 28 USC § 994(m).
63 See Marvin E. Frankel, Criminal Sentences: Law without Order 12-25 (Hill and Wang 1973).
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"real-conduct" sentencing,*' which was designed in part to lessen the
prosecutor's ability to affect the length of the defendant's sentence by
manipulating the charges.
Before Booker, the Guidelines were mandatory. This meant that
judges had to sentence defendants within the applicable Guidelines
range, based on the severity of the offense and the defendant's crimi-
nal history, unless the judge had reason to grant a departure available
under the Guidelines for certain enumerated reasons." The Guidelines
approved of other grounds for departure only where the judge found
"an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree,
not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commis-
sion in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence dif-
ferent from that described."7
In Booker, the Supreme Court held that the mandatory nature
of the Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment." As a result, the
Court excised 18 USC § 3553(b)(1), the provision that made the
Guidelines mandatory, and 18 USC § 3742(e), which established de
novo review of sentencing determinations. The decision rendered the
Guidelines merely advisory.9 Now, judges are required to consider
the § 3553(a) factors in every case to determine whether the Guide-
lines sentence is appropriate.o
3. Expansion of sentencing discretion.
Since Booker, the Supreme Court has continued to expand judi-
cial sentencing discretion. A judge may not presume that a within-
Guidelines sentence is reasonable." The § 3553(a) factors remain the
measure of a sentence's reasonableness? Therefore, § 3553(a)'s re-
quirements that sentences not create "unwarranted disparities" and
that they be "no greater than necessary" have greater import than
they previously did.
6 Real-conduct sentencing refers to sentences that reflect how the crime was actually corn-
mitted rather than how the crime is charged. Judges can account for underlying conduct at sentenc-
ing even where this conduct did not contribute to the charged offenses See USSG § 111.3.
65 See Michael O'Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity in Federal Sentencing, 74 U Cin
L Rev 749,783 (2006).
6 USSG § 1A1.4b ("The sentencing statute permits a court to depart from a guideline-
specified sentence only when it finds 'an aggravating or mitigating circumstance ... not ade-
quately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission."').
67 18 USC § 3553(b)(1).
68 543 US at 244.
69 Id at 255.
70 See Gall v United States, 552 US 38,49-50 (2007).
71 See Nelson v United States, 129 S Ct 890, 892 (2009), citing Rita v United States, 551 US
338,351 (2007); Gall, 552 US at 50.
72 See Gall, 552 US at 49-50.
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Kimbrough enabled judges to depart from the Guidelines purely
for policy reasons in crack cocaine cases. Here the Supreme Court
determined that judges could freely disagree with the crack cocaine
sentencing Guidelines in an ordinary, mine-run case.73 Its decision was
based, in part, on the fact that the United States Sentencing Commis-
sion was not acting in its "characteristic institutional role" when it de-
veloped the crack cocaine Guidelines. Kimbrough left the door open
for policy-based departures from the Guidelines in other circum-
stances, although such departures need to be justified.
The Supreme Court expanded policy-based departures in Spears
v United States and Gall v United States." In Spears, the Court held
that a judge may substitute a different crack-to-powder ratio instead
of using the Guidelines' ratio. Therefore, not only is a judge entitled
to a policy-based disagreement with the Guidelines, but in some cases
he may affirmatively substitute his own policy judgment." In Gall, the
Supreme Court held that extraordinary circumstances need not exist
in order to justify a sentence outside the range recommended by the
Guidelines.o The case is indicative of the Court's shift away from re-
quiring judges to find unique circumstances to justify a departure.
If a judge were to consider the presence of a mandatory mini-
mum when sentencing for the underlying conduct, he would have to
oppose the Guidelines' directive in § 5G1.2(a). Opposition to
§ 5G1.2(a) would probably not be based on unique characteristics of
the particular defendant before the court, but instead on a policy disa-
greement with the Guidelines themselves, much like how judges can
sentence outside the Guidelines in crack cocaine cases regardless of
the individual characteristics of the defendant.
73 Kimbrough, 552 US at 110-11. See also Spears 129 S Ct at 843 (characterizing Kim-
brough as "a recognition of district courts' authority to vary from the crack cocaine Guidelines
based on policy disagreement with them, and not simply based on an individualized determina-
tion that they yield an excessive sentence in a particular case").
74 Kimbrough, 552 US at 109.
75 Id at 108-10.
76 129 S Ct 840 (2009).
77 552 US 38 (2007).
78 129 S Ct at 843 ("A sentencing judge who is given the power to reject the disparity
created by the crack-to-powder ratio must also possess the power to apply a different ratio
which, in his judgment, corrects the disparity.").
79 Id.
80 552 US at 50-51 (holding that sentencing decisions, including sentences outside of the
Guidelines, were to be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard).
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II. JUDICIAL RESPONSES
When faced with the question of whether sentencing courts may
consider the totality of a defendant's sentence when sentencing for
underlying conduct under § 924(c), the Second, Sixth, Seventh, and
Eighth Circuits have found that judges must consider the underlying
conduct in isolation, as if the § 924(c) mandatory minimum did not
exist." Other courts have reasoned that judges should be allowed to
consider the totality of the defendant's sentence.8 2 This Part first dis-
cusses the circuit courts that follow the majority approach and then
discusses several courts that take a different approach.
A. Considering Underlying Conduct in Isolation of Mandatory
Minimums: The Majority Approach
Several circuits have held that a sentencing judge may not con-
sider the totality of a sentence when sentencing a defendant for the
underlying crime where the defendant is already subjected to a count
that bears a mandatory minimum for the use of a firearm." These cir-
cuits rely primarily on two arguments. First, if a sentencing court is
allowed to consider the existence of a consecutive mandatory mini-
mum, the two sentences will effectively bleed into one another, thus
undermining congressional intent. Second, the language of the Guide-
lines arguably supports this interpretation of the statute.
1. The Seventh and Second Circuits: Reliance on
congressional intent.
The Seventh and Second Circuits express a fear that discretionary
sentences and mandatory sentences will bleed into one another-that
81 United States v Chavez, 549 F3d 119, 135 (2d Cir 2008); United States v Franklin, 499 F3d
578, 584 (6th Cir 2007); United States v Roberson, 474 F3d 432,436 (7th Cir 2007); United States v
Gregg, 451 F3d 930,937 (8th Cir 2006).
82 See United States v Ezell, 417 F Supp 2d 667,678 (ED Penn 2006), affd, 265 Fed Appx 70,
71 (3d Cir 2008); United States v Ciszkowski, 430 F Supp 2d 1283, 1288 (MD Fla 2006), affd, 492
F3d 1264, 1271 (11th Cir 2007). See also Franklin, 499 F3d at 587-89 (Moore concurring in the
judgment) ("[N]ot only is it plausible that the sentencing statutes permit the district court to
consider the effect of a mandatory sentence in reaching its ultimate sentencing determination, it
is the only sensible interpretation.").
83 The Ninth Circuit has come to a similar conclusion in United States v Working, 287 F3d 801,
807 (9th Cir 2002), but because this is a pre-Booker case, the Ninth Circuit has indicated that it may
revisit the subject. In United States v Ressam, 593 F3d 1095 (9th Cir 2010), the Ninth Circuit ac-
knowledged that "[w]hen the district court first imposed Ressam's sentence, it considered only the
total term of imprisonment and asked 'the government to allocate according to the statutory mini-
mums among the counts in consecutive and concurrent [terms] as necessary to arrive at' the total."
Id at 1124 n 8.The court then indicated that it did not reach the question of whether the sentencing
judge committed error when he chose "not to determine and impose independent sentences for
each of the three consecutive terms" because neither party raised the issue. Id.
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if a court considers the presence of a consecutive mandatory mini-
mum, the two sentences will be effectively conflated and the court will
actually be reducing the statutory minimum, thus undermining con-
gressional intent." This interpretation is grounded in the § 924(c)(1)(D)
provision that "no term of imprisonment imposed on a person under
this subsection shall run concurrently with any other term of impri-
sonment imposed on the person." Courts interpret the requirement
that the sentence not run concurrently as precluding the possibility of
its consideration in determining the appropriate sentence for the un-
derlying charge. But, significantly, these opinions do not grapple with
alternative interpretations of the word "concurrent.""
In United States v Roberson,6 the Seventh Circuit addressed the
issue of whether it was within the sentencing judge's discretion to ad-
just the sentence for the underlying conviction because she "found a
130 month sentence unreasonable on the facts of this case and con-
trary to the purposes of sentencing under § 3553."" The sentencing
judge indicated that because she "had no power to adjust the ... con-
secutive sentence," she would adjust the sentence for the underlying
conduct." Judge Richard Posner characterized this reasoning as essen-
tially a disagreement with Congress." Furthermore, the court held that
Booker "did not authorize district judges to ignore statutory sentenc-
ing ranges."8 Judge Posner reasoned that by considering the length of
the mandatory minimum, the district judge effectively lowered the
consecutive mandatory minimum.
Additionally, the court indicated that sentencing courts should not
consider the presence of a consecutive mandatory minimum even
though that minimum may be the consequence of prosecutorial discre-
tion to charge the defendant separately for the use of the firearm. If
the government had only charged the defendant with the underlying
offense, the defendant would have likely received a reduced sentence
8 The Sixth Circuit adopted similar reasoning in Franklin, 499 F3d at 584-85:
If the sentence on the count carrying a mandatory consecutive sentence were accumulated
with other sentences for purposes of reaching the total punishment under § 5G1.2(d), Con-
gress's specific statutory requirement that the sentence be imposed independent of any
other sentence and run consecutive to any other sentence would have little meaning.
But the Sixth Circuit has recently indicated that it may reconsider the issue in light of Kim-
brough. See United States v Mongham, 356 Fed Appx 831, 838-39 (6th Cir 2010).
as See Part IlIl.A.
86 474 F3d 432 (7th Cir 2007).
8 Id at 434.
88 Id.
89 Id ("She is of course entitled to her view, but she is not entitled to override Congress's
contrary view.").
90 Roberson, 474 F3d at 434.
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subject only to the Guidelines' firearm enhancement." Judge Posner
stated that "[t]he judiciary has no authority to second-guess the gov-
ernment's choice of which crimes to charge."" The Seventh Circuit held
that sentencing courts must "pick[] a sentence for the [underlying
crime] without regard for the fact that a gun had been used in it, and
then tack[] on" the mandatory minimum sentence." Judge Posner ac-
knowledged the potential tension between mandatory minimum sen-
tences and § 3553(a)'s purposes of punishment, which instruct courts
to avoid unwarranted disparities between similarly situated defend-
ants." He reasoned, however, that the specific nature of § 924(c)
trumps the general instructions set forth in § 3553(a)." Notably, he as-
sumed that § 924(c) governs sentencing for the underlying conviction,
which depends entirely on one's interpretation of the statute.
In United States v Calabrese,7 the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its
decision in Roberson and made clear that "even shaving off a single
month from the sentence on the underlying crime thwarts Congress's
will."% It is worth noting that the Seventh Circuit's second visit to the
issue occurred after the Supreme Court's opinion in Kimbrough.
The Second Circuit's analysis of the issue in United States v Chavez"
is largely similar. The opinion heavily cites to Roberson, and emphasizes
that the consideration of a consecutive mandatory minimum in sentenc-
ing for the underlying conduct would effectively make the § 924(c) sen-
tence concurrent." The court also focused on the clause of § 924(c) that
provides that the penalties for the weapons conviction shall be imposed
"in addition to" the sentence for the underlying conviction"'
91 See text accompanying notes 16-19.
92 Roberson, 474 F3d at 434.
93 Id.
94 Id at 436 ("The district judge was correct that there are two statutes in play and that
they are not completely harmonious."). See also Franklin, 499 F3d at 584-85 ("When any down-
ward variance of the guideline range is based on the effect of a mandatory sentence, congres-
sional intent is repudiated, just as if the mandatory sentence itself had been reduced.").
95 Roberson, 474 F3d at 436. See also Chavez, 549 F3d at 134-35 (determining that § 924(c)
expressly prohibits a judge from using § 3553(a) factors to justify § 924(c)'s mandatory minimum
penalties running concurrently with any other penalties).
96 See Part III.D.
9 572 F3d 362 (7th Cir 2009).
98 Id at 369.
9 549 F3d 119 (2d Cir 2008).
100 Id at 135.
tot Id at 134.
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2. The Eighth Circuit approach: Reliance on the
Guidelines' interpretation.
The Eighth Circuit has relied most heavily on the how the Guide-
lines interpret consecutive mandatory sentences.'" USSG § 5G1.2(a)
states that "the sentence to be imposed on a count for which the statute
(1) specifies a term of imprisonment to be imposed; and (2) requires
that such term of imprisonment be imposed to run consecutively to any
other term of imprisonment, shall be determined by that statute and
imposed independently." In contrast to § 924(c), the Guidelines' lan-
guage clearly supports the prohibition against considering the defend-
ant's consecutive mandatory minimum. The Eighth Circuit has but-
tressed its reliance on the Guidelines' interpretation by reasoning that
"Booker does not relate to statutory sentences.,,... The opinion does not
address an important argument: that the sentencing provision for the
underlying conviction is based on the Guidelines, which are subject to
Booker. In relying on the Guidelines as an authoritative source, the
Eighth Circuit mistakenly treats the Guidelines as mandatory.
B. Considering the Totality of the Defendant's Sentence: The
Minority Approach
Several courts have come to the conclusion that a sentencing judge
may consider the totality of a defendant's sentence in sentencing for
charges underlying a § 924(c) count. District court opinions adopting
this approach have been affirmed on defendants' appeals in the Elev-
enth and Third Circuits,'" although these circuit opinions did not ad-
dress the merits of the district court arguments on the issue. 5 Judge
Karen Nelson Moore of the Sixth Circuit also presented a compelling
argument for considering the totality of the defendant's sentence in her
102 See United States v Hatcher, 501 F3d 931, 933 (8th Cir 2007) (finding the severity of the
mandatory minimum to be an "improper factor" in the district court's sentence for the underly-
ing conduct). Although other circuit opinions rely on the Guidelines' interpretation of the stat-
ute, the Eighth Circuit has relied more exclusively on the Guidelines' interpretation in its rea-
soning. The Eighth Circuit has, however, cited to the Seventh Circuit's analysis in Roberson. See
Gregg, 451 F3d at 937.
103 Hatcher, 501 F3d at 933.
I0 See Ezell, 417 F Supp 2d at 669, affd, 265 Fed Appx 70; Ciszkowski, 430 F Supp 2d at
1283, affd, 492 F3d 1264.
105 Because the cases came to the circuit courts on the defendants' appeals, the opinions do
not create precedent on the issue. See Greenlaw v United States, 128 S Ct 2559, 2566 (2008)
("Even if there might be circumstances in which it would be proper for an appellate court to
initiate plain-error review, sentencing errors that the Government refrained from pursuing
would not fit the bill.").
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concurrence in United States v Franklin.. Several of these opinions
are openly hostile to the severity of § 924(c) consecutive mandatory
minimums.O This Comment does not analyze the wisdom of § 924(c),
but endeavors to discern the degree of discretion judges have in sen-
tencing for the underlying conduct. This Part seeks to disentangle the
justifications for the courts' reasoning.
1. Establishing a floor.
Judge Moore, in her concurrence in Franklin, argued that con-
gressional intent points to the creation of a floor for the defendant's
total sentence."' She indicated that in the absence of a consecutive
mandatory minimum, the sentencing court has the discretion to con-
sider any sentence below the statutory maximum (in this case, twenty
years)."9 Therefore, the defendant's seven-year consecutive mandatory
minimum would only reduce the judge's discretion such that the total
sentence must be between seven and twenty-seven years."' Further-
more, she argued that "[the § 3553(a) factors require the district court
to give at least some consideration to the total amount of time that a
defendant will spend in prison.""' To buttress this argument, Judge
Moore relied on § 3553(a)'s parsimony provision-that a sentence can-
not be "greater than necessary ... to protect the public from further
crimes of the defendant.""12 Key to this argument is that a defendant's
106 499 F3d 578, 587-89 (6th Cir 2007) (Moore concurring in the judgment). Notably, the
Sixth Circuit has indicated that it may overturn its decision in this case. See Mongham, 356 Fed
Appx at 838-39. See also note 84.
107 Mandatory minimums under § 924(c) are widely criticized. In a recent hearing in front
of the House Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security,
federal district judge Paul G. Cassell commented, "[It] remains hard for me to this day to explain
why ... [a] murderer received a far shorter sentence than a drug dealer who simply carried a
firearm to several drug deals." Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Laws-The Issues, Hearing
before the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security of the Committee on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong, 1st Sess 43-44 (2007), online at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/
printers/110th/36343.pdf (visited July 10, 2010). Judge Cassell also broadly criticized federal
mandatory minimums in his testimony and proposed a specific solution that would allow greater
judicial discretion in sentencing for conduct underlying a § 924(c) conviction. But Judge Cassell
emphasized a broader need to get rid of problematically harsh mandatory minimum sentences.
Id. He also proposed "unstacking" § 924(c) penalties. Id. These suggestions are legislative in
nature and have not been enacted.
108 499 F3d at 587-89 (Moore concurring in the judgment) (arguing that using the consecu-
tive mandatory minimum as a floor "is just as plausible a means of vindicating the intent behind
§ 924(c) as is requiring the district court to ignore the mandatory [minimum] in reaching its
decision on the other counts of a conviction").
109 Id at 587.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Franklin, 499 F3d at 587-88 (Moore concurring in the judgment) (noting that under the
majority's rule, any attempt by a district court to calculate a sentence for a defendant based on
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individual history and characteristics may require a greatly reduced
sentence regardless of the existence of a § 924(c) conviction."' The
opinion also hints at the problematic nature of determining an appro-
priate sentence for individual counts of a conviction without regard to
the total sentence. For instance, the availability of a drug treatment
program may depend on the total length of a defendant's sentence,
and a judge may want to consider this as a reason for imposing a par-
ticular sentence for the underlying conduct.14
In United States v Ezell,"' Eastern District of Pennsylvania Judge
Jan Dubois addressed the defendant's challenge to a 132 year manda-
tory minimum sentence."6 "Reluctantly" finding that it must impose
these consecutive sentences,' the court gave a sentence of only one
day for the underlying offenses, a string of bank robberies."' Although
Ezell criticized the mandatory nature of § 924(c), the court did not
discuss its Guidelines departure. Rather, the court's opinion merely
referred to the prison term of 132 years and one day as "the minimum
allowed by law."" The Third Circuit opinion in Ezell did not explicitly
acknowledge the district court's consideration of the mandatory min-
imum in sentencing for the underlying conduct. . Because the district
court's treatment of the mandatory minimum was not raised on ap-
peal, the decision has no precedential authority on this issue.'
2. The Ciszkowski approach.
In United States v Ciszkowski,' the Middle District of Florida
held that "the pertinent question for the district judge, recognizing the
the parsimony provision "would require the district court to sentence the defendant to that
number of years plus seven") (emphasis added).
113 Id.
114 Id at 588 (citing a case in which the district court varied upward from the Guidelines
sentence so that the defendant could qualify for a substance abuse treatment program).
115 417 F Supp 2d 667 (ED Penn 2006), affd, 265 Fed Appx 70 (3d Cir 2008).
116 417 F Supp 2d at 669. Ezell was convicted of six counts of robbery under the Hobbs Act,
18 USC § 1951, aiding and abetting under 18 USC § 2, and six counts under § 924(c), one of
which carried a seven-year mandatory minimum and the others of which carried consecutive
mandatory minimums of twenty-five years each. Ezell, 417 F Supp 2d at 669.
117 Ezell, 417 F Supp 2d at 671. Jamal Ezell challenged the minimum on separation of powers
and due process grounds in addition to challenging the court's interpretation of § 924(c). The de-
fendant also presented a Booker challenge to the mandatory minimum, but this argument was futile
because Booker does not apply to statutorily mandated minimums. Id at 677.
118 Id at 678.
119 Id at 673.
120 265 Fed Appx at 70-71. The court in a footnote stated: "Without consideration of the
§ 924(c) charges, the Guideline Imprisonment Range for Ezell's history and conduct would be
168 to 210 months." Id at 72 n 3.
121 See note 105.
122 430 F Supp 2d 1283 (MD Fla 2006), affd, 492 F3d 1264 (11th Cir 2007).
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inevitable minimum mandatory sentence, is what additional term at-
tributable to the advisory guidelines component of the total sentence
is required to create a total sentence that is 'reasonable' under Booker
in light of the factors arrayed at Section 3553(a)."... On its face, this
reasoning is not unlike the reasoning in the Franklin concurrence.12
The Ciszkowski court, however, established different formulas de-
pending on whether the mandatory minimum is greater or less than
the advisory Guidelines sentence. The court reasoned that the statu-
tory purpose of the lesser Guidelines range can be served by the
greater statutory minimum. This reasoning seems to suggest a de facto
concurrent sentence while maintaining a formally consecutive sen-
tence. The court acknowledged that in the majority of cases, the de-
fendant will be sentenced to all or the majority of the recommended
Guidelines sentence,12 which may serve to counter the presumption
that once the presence of the mandatory minimum can be considered,
wide departures from that minimum would frequently occur. Invoking
the express language of § 924(c), the court found that it is necessary
for the sentence to be served consecutively to the sentence for the
underlying crimes, and that the statute is silent regarding judges' dis-
cretion in sentencing for the underlying crimes.'
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.' The district court had considered
the totality of the defendant's sentence.19 The § 924(c) minimum was
30 years, and the Guidelines range for the two convictions of underly-
ing conduct was 188 to 235 months.'' The district court ultimately sen-
tenced Wojtek Ciszkowski to 12 months for each count of underlying
conduct - a radical departure from the Guidelines - and the Eleventh
Circuit found that the district court's sentence was reasonable. It did
not directly address this portion of the district court's analysis, but it
acknowledged that the district court was "ostensively taking into con-
sideration the 30-year mandatory minimum to be imposed on the
§ 924(c) count." 3'
123 430 F Supp 2d at 1287.
124 See notes 108-16 and accompanying text.
125 Ciszkowski, 430 F Supp 2d at 1288.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Importantly, this issue was not raised on appeal, again eliminating any precedential
value on this issue. See note 105.
129 See Ciszkowski, 430 F Supp 2d at 1287-88.
130 Id at 1287.
131 Ciszkowski, 492 F3d at 1268 n 3.
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3. Undercutting prosecutorial discretion.
Another reason judges may want to consider the totality of a de-
fendant's sentence is the degree of prosecutorial discretion involved in
§ 924(c) cases. 132 Section 3553(a)(6) directs judges to consider "the need
to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with
similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct." It draws
the judge's attention to the defendant's conduct rather than to the stat-
utes under which the defendant was convicted. In disallowing unwar-
ranted disparities between similarly situated defendants, the statute
arguably compels a sentencing court to consider the prosecutor's deci-
sion to charge the defendant separately for the use of the weapon under
§ 924(c) rather than simply charging the defendant for the underlying
conduct with a Guidelines enhancement for using the weapon.13
The district court in United States v Roberson'4" ("Roberson II")
engaged in a prosecutorial discretion analysis. Judge Joan Gottschall
pointed out that under the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the
question, prosecutorial discretion trumps judicial discretion when the
prosecutor has a choice whether to charge the defendant with a count
bearing a mandatory minimum.s Namely, the prosecutor, by deciding
whether to charge the defendant for the underlying crime and § 924(c)
or for just the underlying crime with a Guidelines enhancement, ulti-
mately has much more say than the judge in what sentence the de-
fendant will receive. Any discrepancy between the mandatory mini-
mum and the Guidelines enhancement is largest when the judge can-
not take the discrepancy into account when sentencing for the under-
lying conduct. Ultimately, Judge Gottschall relied on other mitigating
factors to give the defendant a sentence ten months less than the sen-
tence the Guidelines suggested; given the Seventh Circuit's instruc-
tions on remand, she was unable to take into account the prosecutor's
discretion in charging the case.13
132 Particularly harsh mandatory minimums implicate prosecutorial discretion in other ways
as well. For instance, in United States v Angelos, 345 F Supp 2d 1227 (D Utah 2004), the district
court discussed how the defendant's sentence was largely a product of a particularly difficult plea
bargaining process: "In short, Mr. Angelos faced the choice of accepting 15 years in prison or
insisting on a trial by jury at the risk of a life sentence." Id at 1232.
133 See, for example, USSG § 2B3.1(b)(2) (indicating that for robbery, discharging a firearm
carries a seven-level enhancement, using a firearm carries a six-level enhancement, and brandishing
or possessing a firearm carries a five-level enhancement). An enhancement for brandishing or
possessing a firearm, if applied to a bank robber with a criminal history category of II, would in-
crease the Guidelines sentence from a range of 46 to 57 months to a range of 78 to 97 months.
I3 573 F Supp 2d 1040 (ND Ill 2008).
135 Id at 1045.
136 Id at 1051.
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This type of analysis is not unique to Roberson II. Although Ezell
did not reference § 3553(a)(6), the court seemingly invoked prosecu-
torial discretion concerns when it compared the defendant's would-be
sentence under the Guidelines alone (168 to 210 months) with the
mandatory minimum under § 924(c), which was 132 years for the
weapons convictions alone. The court noted: "The government has not
provided a single convincing reason why a sentence under the Sen-
tencing Guidelines would not achieve all of the goals of sentencing in
this case.".. By questioning the wisdom of the 132 year sentence in
comparison to the Guidelines sentence the defendant would have re-
ceived, the court highlighted the degree of prosecutorial discretion
involved. In contrast, the court emphasized its complete lack of discre-
tion to reduce the mandatory minimum.'" After comparing the Guide-
lines sentence to the mandatory minimum, the court sentenced the
defendant to "132 years and one day, the minimum allowed by law."..
Prosecutorial charging discretion often tends to conflict with
§ 3553(a)(6) and real-conduct sentencing. In response to other areas of
potential conflict between prosecutorial discretion and § 3553(a)(6)'s
directive, most circuits have held that any difference between sen-
tences for defendants charged separately with § 924(c) conduct and
those charged without the separate mandatory minimum is an accept-
able consequence of prosecutorial discretion.'40
III. MANDATORY MINIMUMs ESTABLISH A FLOOR FOR
CONSIDERING § 3553(A) FACTORS
This Comment argues that § 924(c) establishes an absolute floor.
The extent to which a defendant's sentence differs from the Guide-
lines is determined by the § 3553(a) factors so long as the defendant's
total sentence is not below that floor.
Many factors compel sentencing courts to consider the presence
of a mandatory minimum when determining the necessary punish-
ment for the defendant's underlying conduct. First, this Part argues
137 Ezell, 417 F Supp 2d at 672.
138 Id at 672-73.
139 Id at 673.
140 See, for example, United States v Molina, 530 F3d 326,332 (5th Cir 2008) ("[A]s a gener-
al rule, ... substantial deference is accorded decisions requiring the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion, and those decisions are not subject to judicial review absent a showing of actual vin-
dictiveness or an equal protection violation.") (citations and quotation marks omitted). See also
Williams v Illinois, 399 US 235, 243 (1970) ("The Constitution permits qualitative differences in
meting out punishment and there is no requirement that two persons convicted of the same
offense receive identical sentences."); United States v Duncan, 479 F3d 924, 928 (7th Cir 2007)
("Absent a showing of invidious discrimination, we shall not second guess a prosecutor's decision
regarding the charges it chooses to bring.").
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that § 924(c) should be interpreted in light of 18 USC § 1028A. Sec-
tion 1028A, which provides mandatory minimum sentences for identi-
ty theft, suggests that when Congress required that § 924(c) sentences
not run concurrently, Congress did not mean to restrict sentencing
discretion with regard to the length of the sentence for the underlying
felony."' Second, recent Supreme Court precedent establishes the
§ 3553(a) factors as the definitive measure of a reasonable sentence,
absent contrary congressional intent. Some specific § 3553(a) factors
allow judges to consider the presence of a consecutive mandatory sen-
tence. Third, this Part shows that there is nothing in the text or history
of § 924(c) that suggests that Congress meant to prohibit sentencing
courts from considering the presence of the mandatory minimum
when sentencing for underlying conduct. Finally, this Part addresses
Judge Posner's argument that the consideration of a subsequent man-
datory minimum necessarily reduces the length of that mandatory
minimum, effectively creating a concurrent sentencing system.
A. Interpreting § 924(c) in Light of § 1028A
Since originally enacting § 924(c), Congress has demonstrated its
ability to explicitly preclude a sentencing court from considering the
totality of a defendant's sentence when sentencing for the underlying
conduct. In doing so, Congress showed its understanding that a
mandate that the sentence not run "concurrently" does not limit this
kind of judicial discretion. In 2004, Congress established mandatory
minimums in identity theft cases in the Identity Theft Penalty En-
hancement Act.'42 Like § 924(c), § 1028A contains a clause mandating
that its terms of imprisonment not run concurrent to any sentence for
underlying conduct." Congress deemed it necessary, however, to in-
clude an additional clause indicating that sentencing courts are not to
account for the presence of the § 1028A mandatory minimum when
sentencing for the underlying conduct:
[I]n determining any term of imprisonment to be imposed for the
felony during which the means of identification was transferred,
possessed, or used, a court shall not in any way reduce the term to
be imposed for such crime so as to compensate for, or otherwise
141 Although § 1028A was passed after § 924(c), Congress has amended § 924(c) more
recently. See Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act § 5, Pub L No 109-92, 119 Stat 2095,
2102 (2005), codified at 18 USC § 924(c)(5).
142 Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act § 2, Pub L No 108-275, 118 Stat 831, 831-32
(2004), codified at 18 USC § 1028A.
143 18 USC § 1028A(b)(2).
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take into account, any separate term of imprisonment imposed or
to be imposed for a violation of this section.
The inclusion of this additional clause demonstrates that Congress did
not believe that the first clause would effectuate this purpose, because
if it did, the second clause would be redundant, violating an accepted
canon of statutory construction.' To be clear, in enacting § 1028A,
Congress did not understand a prohibition on "concurrent" sentencing
to preclude judges from considering the mandatory minimum when
sentencing for the underlying conduct. Notably, there is no provision
in § 924(c) that corresponds to the above-quoted explicit limit on judi-
cial discretion. Section 924(c) contains only a prohibition on "concur-
rent" sentencing that is almost identical to the one in § 1028A(b)(2).
Courts should employ the canon of construction that Congress uses
the same term consistently in different statutes." Congress's ability to
be clear about the issue in § 1028A therefore indicates that Congress
did not mean to limit a sentencing court's discretion with respect to
underlying convictions under § 924(c).
The legislative history of § 1028A reveals that it was meant to af-
fect judicial sentencing discretion, whereas the legislative history of
§ 924(c) does not reference how the proposed legislation could affect
underlying sentencing. The Congressional Record and House Report
indicate that when passing § 1028A, Congress meant to prevent judges
from considering the existence of a subsequent mandatory minimum
when sentencing for the underlying conduct.147 The legislative history
demonstrates that, in large part, while both § 924(c) and § 1028A were
reactions to new criminal threats, § 1028A responded to the growing
144 18 USC § 1028A(b)(3).
145 See United States v Alaska, 521 US 1 (1997) ("The Court will avoid an interpretation of a
statute that renders some words altogether redundant.") (quotation marks omitted); Circuit City
Stores, Inc v Adams, 532 US 105,117-19 (2001) (employing a similar form of statutory interpreta-
tion in the context of Commerce Clause jurisdiction).
146 See Hawaiian Airlines v Norris, 512 US 246, 254 (1994) (interpreting the word "griev-
ances" by looking to past congressional usage); Pierce v Underwood, 487 US 552, 564 (1988)
(interpreting the words "substantially justified" in 28 USC § 2412(d)(1)(A) by explaining how
those words are used in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
147 Compare 114 Cong Rec at H 22231-48 (cited in note 22); text accompanying notes 19-41
with Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act: Report Together with Dissenting Views, HR Rep
No 108-528, 108th Cong, 2d Sess 9 (2004), reprinted in 2004 USCCAN 779, 786 ("Additionally,
[§ 1028(c)] contains several provisions to ensure the intent of this legislation is carried out. It
mandates that the enhancement be imposed as a consecutive sentence and expressly prohibits a
judge from ordering the sentence to run concurrently with that of the underlying offense."); 150
Cong Rec H 4811 (daily ed June 23, 2004) (Rep Schiff) (arguing that, under the predecessor to
§ 1028A, judges sentenced identity theft concurrently with underlying conduct, making two
convictions "merge[] for sentencing purposes"); id (Rep Sensenbrenner) ("[O]pponents of man-
datory minimums would have a much more compelling case if they could assure Congress that
the judges are faithfully following the sentencing guidelines").
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threat of identity theft by identifying as the problem existing lax sen-
tencing practices for the underlying conduct. Conversely, congression-
al debate on § 924(c) overwhelmingly focused on creating a separate
deterrent for the use of handguns in the course of other felonies. The
differences in the statutes' language reflect their differing purposes.
Although § 1028A helps illuminate the correct interpretation of
§ 924(c), no court has used § 1028A to construe the language of
§ 924(c) in sentencing for conduct underlying the firearms charge. The
First Circuit compared the two statutes when determining the reason-
ableness of a sentence underlying a § 1028A conviction in Vidal-
Reyes.19 The court determined that although the district court does not
have authority to consider the existence of the mandatory § 1028A
sentence, it is only because Congress was clear on this point in the statu-
tory language.so In dicta, the court reasoned that in absence of this clari-
ty, for instance in § 924(c) cases, sentencing discretion to consider the
existence of a subsequent mandatory sentence would be preserved."'
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have cited Vidal-Reyes in discussing
sentencing discretion for convictions underlying § 924(c), although nei-
ther has engaged in any comparative analysis of the statutes.152
B. The Directives of § 3553(a) and § 3661
Absent evidence of contrary congressional intent, the § 3553(a)
factors remain the measure of reasonableness. A sentencing court
should be able to consider the totality of a defendant's sentence under
§ 3553(a)."' Under §§ 3553(a)(2), 3553(a)(6), and 3661, the defendant's
total sentence may often be a relevant sentencing consideration. In
other words, § 924(c) provides a floor over which a judge must apply
the affirmative directives of § 3553(a).
14 See 114 Cong Rec at H 22231-48 (cited in note 22).
149 See notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
150 See Vidal-Reyes, 562 F3d at 52.
151 Id ("[Section] 924(c) does not contain any provision that parallels § 1028A(b)(3), and
thus no plain text bearing directly on the question of when the mandatory term can be taken into
account by sentencing courts.").
152 See United States v Calabrese, 572 F3d 362, 369 (7th Cir 2009); United States v Ressam,
593 F3d 1095, 1124 n 8 (9th Cir 2010).
153 Allowing judges discretion to consider the mandatory minimum when sentencing for the
underlying offense could create problems if the mandatory minimum sentence is overturned. In
these cases, the only remaining sentence would be for the underlying offense sentence, which the
judge intentionally lowered because of the (now missing) mandatory minimum sentence. These
problems are likely to be minimal, however, because sentences are rarely overturned. More than 85
percent of all weapons-offense charges result in a guilty plea, and less than 8 percent go to trial.
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Federal Justice Statistics 2006 table 4.2, online at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/
content/publhtml/fjsst/2006/fs06st.cfm (visited May 11, 2010). Furthermore, on appeal in 2006,
approximately 87 percent of firearms convictions were affirmed. Id at table 6.2.
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There are several ways in which § 3553(a) factors may support a
lower sentence for a conviction underlying a § 924(c) offense. Most
importantly, the parsimony provision of § 3553(a)(2) requires that
sentencing courts not issue a sentence "greater than necessary" to
serve the statutorily enumerated purposes of punishment. If a defend-
ant is facing a lengthy mandatory consecutive sentence, he may not
need as long a sentence for the underlying conduct in order to "afford
adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,"'5 "protect the public from
[his] further crimes,"' or "provide him with needed educational or
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in
the most effective manner."..
Second, § 3553(a)(6) requires sentencing judges to consider the
need to avoid "unwarranted disparities among defendants with similar
records who have been found guilty of similar conduct." This may
support a judge's ability to account for a prosecutor's decision to
charge a defendant under § 924(c) rather than seeking a Guidelines
enhancement for the use of a firearm where this decision results in a
sentence longer than would be recommended under the Guidelines.
Judge Gottschall uses this very argument-that prosecutorial discretion
tends to overshadow judicial discretion in § 924(c) cases."' To effec-
tuate § 3553(a)(6), judges should be able to counteract the disparities
caused by prosecutorial discretion through more lenient sentences for
underlying offenses.
Finally, § 3661, although not as directly relevant as § 3553, also pro-
vides direction to district courts in their consideration of the totality of
a defendant's sentence. The statute provides that "[n]o limitation shall
be placed on the information concerning the background, character,
and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the
United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an
appropriate sentence."m Allowing sentencing courts to consider the
totality of the defendant's conduct adds more weight to § 3553(a)(6)'s
mandate that similarly situated defendants receive similar sentences.
This Comment does not argue that § 3553(a) and § 3661 always
compel courts to lower sentences for underlying conduct because of
the presence of a consecutive mandatory minimum. Rather, it argues
154 18 USC § 3553(a)(2)(B).
155 18 USC § 3553(a)(2)(C).
156 18 USC § 3553(a)(2)(D).
157 See Roberson II, 573 F Supp 2d at 1045. But see Williams v Illinois, 399 US 235, 243
(1970) ("Sentencing judges are vested with wide discretion in the exceedingly difficult task of
determining the appropriate punishment in the countless variety of situations that appear.");
United States v Duncan, 479 F3d 924, 928 (7th Cir 2007).
158 18 USC § 3661.
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that district courts must always consider whether these factors compel
a different sentence. It is conceivable that, in the extraordinary case,
the § 3553(a) factors may compel a judge to impose as low a sentence
as permissible, just as the factors may sometimes compel a judge to
impose a sentence for the underlying conviction that is higher than
that suggested by the Guidelines. The natural lower limit on a judge's
discretion is the mandatory minimum itself.
C. The Language of § 924(c)
The language of the statute, even when interpreted separately
from § 1028A, suggests that existing levels of discretion for underlying
conduct remain intact. The statute discusses the presence of underly-
ing sentences in two places.' First, in describing the mandatory mini-
mum as being "in addition to the punishment provided for such crime
of violence or drug trafficking crime,", the statute's language implies
that the punishment for underlying conduct is statutorily provided.
Second, the statute also states that "no term of imprisonment imposed
on a person under this subsection shall run concurrently with any other
term of imprisonment imposed on the person, including any term of
imprisonment imposed for the crime of violence or drug trafficking
crime during which the firearm was used, carried, or possessed." 6' Thus,
in mandating that the minimum not run concurrently, the statute pre-
cludes a defendant from being able to serve time for two convictions at
once. Importantly, this language does not directly speak to the length of
the sentence for the underlying felony, nor does it directly speak to
judicial discretion in the determination of that length. Rather, the stat-
ute only requires that whatever sentence a judge determines is appro-
priate for the underlying felony will end before the defendant begins
serving his sentence for the use of a weapon. The statute creates a
completely separate crime and sentence. 62 It is fully consistent with
159 The Second Circuit has read the opening clause of the section to imply that the § 924
mandatory minimums are triggered only where no other statute (potentially including any stat-
ute outlawing the underlying conduct) contains a greater mandatory minimum. See United States
v Whitley, 529 F3d 150, 153-58 (2d Cir 2008). This is not a widespread reading, but for now it is
useful to note that this is a third section of the statute that could, in theory, interact with underly-
ing conduct. Even if such a reading is taken seriously, however, the presence of any underlying
conduct conviction bearing a greater mandatory minimum changes the sentence for the § 924
conduct and not the other way around. The language of this clause cannot be read to affect sen-
tencing discretion for underlying conduct. See note 7.
160 18 USC § 924(c)(1)(A).
161 18 USC § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii).
162 See Simpson v United States, 435 US 6, 10 (1977) ("[Section] 924(c) creates an offense
distinct from the underlying federal felony.").
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the language of the statute to interpret it as primarily concerned that
the defendant is indeed punished separately for the use of the weapon.
One potential justification for curbing judicial discretion is that
another source of law indicates that judges do not have the discretion
to account for the existence of a mandatory minimum when sentenc-
ing for the underlying conduct-namely USSG § 5G1.2(a).m' Because
the Guidelines are now only advisory, and sentencing courts are free
to disagree with the Guidelines, the Guidelines themselves cannot be
taken to preclude a sentencing court from considering the existence of
the mandatory minimums. Several circuits, however, have argued that
the shift to an advisory Guidelines regime does not affect cases that
involve mandatory minimums.6 1 Several of the recent Supreme Court
cases do note that advisory sentencing is inapplicable to departures
from congressionally mandated minimums. 6 This raises the question
whether the mandatory minimum statute is applicable to the judge's
sentencing discretion when determining the appropriate sentence for
the underlying conviction. If Booker sentencing discretion applies to
underlying convictions that ordinarily fall under the Guidelines, then
an additional charge under § 924(c) should not negate Booker sen-
tencing discretion for underlying conduct.
D. The Majority's Misconception
The Seventh Circuit in Roberson argued that § 924(c) implies that
judges should not have discretion to consider the totality of the de-
fendant's sentence. In order for the statute to be interpreted as imply-
ing this limitation, such discretion would have to be incompatible with
the statute's clear purpose. The statute, however, could easily be read
to respond to weapons-related sentencing solely by creating a sepa-
rate offense and separate mandatory sentence from which the district
court is not allowed to depart. Section 924(c) should not be taken to
imply that Congress intended to increase the penalties for the under-
lying conduct. Congress only intended to punish the use of the weap-
on, which cannot be considered part of the underlying conduct. As
163 See United States v Hatcher, 501 F3d 931, 933 (8th Cir 2007) (referring to § 5G1.2(a) as
"unequivocal" that the mandatory minimum may not be taken into account). The Ninth Circuit
adopted very similar reasoning in the pre-Booker case United States v Working, 287 F3d 801 (9th
Cir 2002), but it has indicated that it may reconsider the issue in light of the intervening Supreme
Court precedent. See note 83.
16 See Kimbrough, 552 US at 91,101-02.
165 See, for example, Roberson, 474 F3d at 437.
16 See, for example, Kimbrough, 552 US at 104-05.
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discussed above, such a reading is completely consistent with the text
of the statute as well of its legislative history.
Furthermore, reading § 924(c) to restrict sentencing court discre-
tion to account for the existence of the mandatory minimum will often
conflict with the § 3553(a) factors. The Seventh Circuit acknowledges
a conflict between § 924(c) and the § 3553(a) factors, and resolves the
conflict by arguing that § 3553(a) is a "very general statute" whereas
the mandatory minimums are "specifically prescribed by Congress."m
Section 924(c) is only more specific if Congress intended § 924(c) to
apply to judicial sentencing discretion for the underlying conduct. If
Congress prescribed § 924(c) to serve as a floor, then Congress still
requires judges to consider the § 3553(a) factors when they sentence
defendants under the Guidelines. Section 924(c) is only "specifically"
applicable to judicial discretion with respect to sentencing for underly-
ing conduct if the statute purports to have anything to do with discre-
tion for underlying conduct sentences. Neither the language of the
statute nor the legislative history suggests that the statute addresses
sentencing discretion for underlying conduct. Rather, § 1028A strong-
ly implies that § 924(c) was not meant to address judicial discretion
for underlying conduct.
Judge Posner argues that § 924(c) must control judicial discretion
for underlying conduct, because if judges were allowed to consider
mandatory sentences, some judges may be inclined to reduce their
discretionary sentences. A reduction in discretionary sentences would
result in a "carve out" of the mandatory sentence, because judges would
not give such a low discretionary sentence if it were not for the high
mandatory sentence. If this were to happen, then defendants would
have shorter overall sentences than they would have if judges could not
reduce their discretionary sentences. Therefore, the discretionary sen-
tences would be lower because of a mandatory minimum. But there is
nothing wrong with this outcome, so long as Congress gave judges the
discretion to consider such factors under § 3553(a) and § 3661 and Con-
gress never revoked that discretion. Section 924(c) is not about max-
imizing a defendant's sentence whenever possible; the statute punishes
the defendant's use of a firearm in a felony with a certain number of
years in addition to whatever discretionary sentence the judge imposes
for the underlying conduct. If Congress thought that the statute should
punish the defendant's use of a weapon in addition to the discretionary
sentence the judge would have given if the judge did not know about
167 See Parts II.B and III.C.
168 Roberson, 474 F3d at 436.
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the § 924(c) sentence, then Congress should have said so. Congress ar-
ticulated this preference in § 1028A but did not do so in § 924(c).
CONCLUSION
Nothing in § 924(c) or in its legislative history indicates that Con-
gress intended to reduce judicial sentencing discretion for conduct un-
derlying the statute. Furthermore, when the statute is read in light of
§ 1028A, it is clear that § 924(c) is not meant to limit judicial discretion.
Although the Guidelines indicate that courts should not consider the
existence of a mandatory minimum,"' Booker rendered the Guidelines
merely advisory."o Moreover, after Kimbrough, a court may depart from
the Guidelines for purely policy-based reasons."' Sentencing courts
should, therefore, be able to exercise their sentencing discretion to en-
sure that defendants' sentences are not greater than necessary to
achieve § 3553's purposes. So long as the sentencing court's reasons for
considering the totality of the defendant's sentence are grounded in
§ 3553(a)'s factors, the court's reasons are permissible. It is incorrect to
say that a sentencing court must ignore a consecutive mandatory mini-
mum when the presence of that minimum affects how the § 3553(a)
factors apply to the underlying felony conviction. To say that a sentenc-
ing court, when determining the minimum punishment necessary, must
ignore that a defendant will consecutively serve five, thirty, or fifty-five
years is absurd.
169 USSG § 5G1.2(a).
170 Booker, 543 US at 245.
171 Kimbrough, 552 US at 91.
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